

# newsletter

## T.I.S.S. Study of War Project Continues

### T.I.S.S. Holds Conference on the Perspectives of Political Science and Conflict Resolution

Continuing with the Study of War Project, T.I.S.S. sponsored the seventh workshop in a series of nine examining the topic from the perspective of political science and conflict resolution. The two-day meeting was held at the William and Ida Friday Center on the campus of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill on September 15-16, 1995. The first day of the proceedings, devoted to political science, featured four prominent scholars in the discipline. After presentations by each panelists, questions and comments were posed by other speakers, as well as members of the audience; four well-known scholars in the field of conflict resolution spoke on the second day.

#### “Political Science, Conflict Resolution, and War”

William and Ida Friday Center  
Chapel Hill, NC  
September 15-16, 1995

**About the Speakers.** T.I.S.S. invited a total of eight distinguished speakers to make presentations about the contributions of political science and conflict resolution to the study of war. Among the speakers on political science, **Glenn Snyder** is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is currently writing a book on alliances and alignments in the international system. **Kenneth Waltz** is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, where he taught for more than twenty years. A past president of the American Political Science Association, he has published many books and articles on the relationship between the structure of the international system and state behavior. **Bruce Bueno de Mesquita** is Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He is currently co-authoring a book (with A.F.K. Organski) titled *Principles of International Politics: People's Power, Preferences, and Perceptions*. **Jack Levy** is Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University. He is the author of the forthcoming book

titled *Power, Politics, and Perception: Essays on the Causes of War*.

Among the panelists on conflict resolution, **Thomas Schelling** is Lucius N. Litauer Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, at Harvard University and Distinguished University Professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland. **Bruce Russett** is Dean Acheson Professor of Political Science and chair of the department at Yale University. **Ole Holsti** is George V. Allen Professor of Political Science at Duke University. He is the author of several books including the forthcoming *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. **Anatol Rapoport** is Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto.

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**Conference Proceedings.** After welcoming remarks by Dick Kohn and Alex Roland to the eighty-five members of the audience, the first day of the conference began with a presentation by **Glenn Snyder** entitled, “The Evolution of International Security Studies.”

The birth of security studies in the United States can hardly be separated from the origins of international politics as a sub-field within political science. Both were fostered by traumatic events in the

real world: the emergence of the Cold War and the consequent need for the U.S. to maintain powerful military forces in peacetime, and the advent of nuclear weapons. The birthplace of both disciplines was the University of Chicago. Chicago was not only the academic home of Hans Morgenthau, the founder of the international relations field, it was also the training ground for several young scholars who later dispersed to Yale, Columbia, and Princeton universities and who founded the sub-field of security studies. It was one such scholar, Bill Fox, who in 1944 coined the term “superpowers,” naming the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Fox determined that these countries would dominate the international scene on the basis of conventional power capabilities.

The Triangle Institute for Security Studies is an interdisciplinary consortium of faculty members from three North Carolina research universities who share an interest in national and international security issues, broadly defined. Its objective is to promote communication and cooperation among its members, especially in research, education, and public outreach activities.

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The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

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Early work by political scientists tended to focus on civil-military relations: the policy process, rather than policy itself. By the late 1950s, however, and largely by way of reaction to John Foster Dulles’ famous “massive retaliation” speech, the emphasis had shifted over to policy, specifically the policy of nuclear

deterrence. Seminal ideas developed at the RAND corporation--with political scientist Bernard Brodie, another Chicago alumnus, taking the lead-- gradually found their way to the academic research centers and a great explosion of theorizing about deterrence and nuclear strategy took place in the late 1950s and early ‘60s. This included innovative works on arms control based on the notion of “stability,” and, with Thomas Schelling showing the way, applications of game theory and bargaining theory. Others began during this time to expand the limits of the definition of deterrence via such concepts such as “counter-force vs. counter-value” weapons and targeting, and “flexible response” strategies. During this time, Kenneth Waltz stressed the importance of “polarity” in the international system, which was to become a core concept for “realist” theory and security studies.

The 1960s also saw the birth of two other distinct traditions. Quantitatively oriented data and methodologies took off under the tutelage of Daniel Singer and has been carried on by contemporary scholars such as Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. The “Kantian” tradition presently represented in the workshop by Bruce Russett also was developing during this period of theorizing.

The field rather languished in the late 1960s and early 1970s, partly because of a sense that all the basic theoretical work had been done and partly because of the inhibiting effect of the Vietnam War. Around the mid-1970s, however, a renaissance began and is still underway. A new generation of scholars found many lacunae in the work of their predecessors. New directions in theory moved some scholars away from the previous generation’s penchant for abstract logical deduction, introducing findings from psychology into the theory of deterrence (e.g., Robert Jervis) and discovering the enriching possibilities of history (as represented in the work of Jack Levy), utilizing detailed case studies of actual decision making. New paradigms, e.g., “bureaucratic politics” and “crisis management,” were developed. Conventional arms and warfare came in for long overdue attention, as did alliances. At the same time, research on nuclear strategy continued, aided by an increased availability of data and stimulated by new policy ideas, such as former President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative proposal. New debates erupted--e.g., over the validity of deterrence theory and between “deterriers” and the “war fighters.”

Dr. Snyder concluded his remarks by commenting that, like the broader field of international politics, the field of security studies is challenged by the

end of the Cold War: challenged to re-define the role of force in a single superpower world, to invent criteria for identifying the “vital interests” of the United States, to predict the nature of a possible future multipolar (and proliferated?) world, and to assess the changing nature of alliances, to cite but a few issues. It also remains to be seen whether “security studies” will remain a distinct sub-field within international politics, as some scholars press to expand the definition of security to include questions of political economy, the environment, and migration.

The comment period revolved to a considerable extent around the issue of the separation of comparative politics, international political economy and international security. Discussion was prompted by Timothy Lomperis’ question regarding the importance of the disintegration from within of nation states for international security studies. Dr. Snyder responded by saying that he felt that while international relations scholars should be attentive to some extent to the domestic politics of countries, there were legitimate reasons to treat international relations and comparative politics as distinct fields. The goal of security studies is to explain military strategies. Though there may be some areas of overlap, such as acquisition of strategic raw materials, if the goal of a policy is economic, it should be dealt with as a separate topic. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita disagreed, arguing that international relations cannot be separated from comparative politics. The ability of foreign policy makers to retain their jobs are threatened not only by foreign adversaries, but by domestic constituents as well. Jack Levy agreed with Bueno de Mesquita, pointing to fruitful lines of research on the relationship between trade ties and international conflict and on the domestic political economy of defense spending.

**Kenneth Waltz** followed Dr. Snyder with a talk on “The Future of War.” Optimism over the prospects for peace grows typically through long years of peace among major states in the world and luxuriates in the afterglow of victories won in big wars. The periods before and after 1914 and 1991 are examples of this, according to Dr. Waltz. When the “right” forces win an international conflict, it *seems* to establish the triumph of a set of ideas on how societies are best ordered. In the past, as in the present, thinkers have argued that the growth of democracy among the countries of the world, increasing interdependence, and the apparent shift in emphasis by policy makers from political concerns to economic concerns means that war is unlikely. Nation-states allegedly are learning that war does not pay, and the creation of international institutions has furthered the cause of peace.

Dr. Waltz provided some cautionary examples intended to make the point that we should not be quick to discount the possibility of war reappearing in the near future. World War I, he argued, occurred despite the fact that the countries involved were the most tightly interdependent in the world at that time. Democracy is by no means solidly rooted in the countries of the former Soviet Union. They did not really “learn” that international conflict does not pay. The currently reduced fears of general war are owed to the fact that the ex-Soviet rulers “learned” that their country was losing the Cold War. A lack of information about who could win a war, after all, causes war, according to Waltz’s analysis.

Because the international system has not undergone a true transformation away from anarchy, one should expect the perpetuation of international politics in the historical pattern reflected in realist thinking through the ages. Yet, explicitly or implicitly, the notion of *two* systems of international politics has developed, with different modes of thought and action appropriate in different spheres, or on different issues. It is argued that realist theories do not apply to the industrialized countries because war is obsolete. Among the “less developed countries,” however, it is difficult for anyone to say that power politics are irrelevant.

Dr. Waltz does believe that the world of the future will continue to be peaceful at the “center” of international politics. The presence of nuclear weapons represents a qualitative shift in the international political arena, because nations equipped with conventional weapons are uncertain about the amount of damage that can be inflicted on one another. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, can inflict a *certain* amount of devastation. Had the United States and the Soviet Union not possessed nuclear weapons, Waltz thinks, the Cold War most likely would have turned “hot.”

This line of thinking leads Waltz to conclude that nuclear proliferation in the “less developed world” would be a positive force for war reduction. War is more unthinkable between Pakistan and India than it ever has been before owing to the possession by both parties of nuclear weapons. If two countries possess weapons against which it is impossible to defend oneself, both will be careful to avoid war, because neither believes it can control the amount of damage that they will suffer—that is up to their opponent.

Dr. Waltz’s argument, which he has made for a number of years, did not fail to provoke lively

discussion. Bueno de Mesquita commented that the “certainty” of nuclear destruction should not be treated as a given--the level of certainty can be influenced by choices, pointing out that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was created precisely because there was concern that states would attempt to reduce the certainty of the effectiveness of nuclear weapons. Waltz responded that such developments are not important--that states finding themselves on the brink of a nuclear exchange will, as shown by the Cuba Missile Crisis, try their hardest to back away from that brink. Robert O’Connell later commented from the audience that it may prove to be the case that it takes a while to learn deterrence--new nuclear powers might pose a danger until they have gone through a learning process. Waltz, however, asserted that nuclear weapons are teachers powerful enough to convince anyone that vulnerability to devastating retaliation would be inescapable.

Bruce Russett questioned whether democracy and institutions were as unimportant in the recent transformations as Waltz portrayed them to be. He suggested that the much greater range of ideas permitted to circulate in the Soviet Union may have led Soviet leaders to be more tolerant of greater dissent in Eastern Europe and to be more open toward the West. As for interdependence, Russett hypothesizes that the *anticipation* of a need for greater access to capital and technology (interdependence, in other words) may have contributed to the change in the Soviet Union’s foreign policy, and, ultimately to the transformation of the international political environment. Finally, Russett said that one should not be quick to discount the potential importance of the role played by international institutions such as the Helsinki Agreements in pushing along change within the Soviet Union.

After lunch, **Bruce Bueno de Mesquita** addressed the audience on the question of “The War Choice: Why is War Ever Chosen Over Peace?” Dr. Bueno de Mesquita provided the audience with examples of how rational actor models of international relations, and of war in particular, provide theoretical rigor, new insights, and falsifiable hypotheses. Fundamental to rational choice models is the Coase Theorem, which, in brief, states that where people disagree over the allocation of some good, there always is some kind of settlement in which both sides would be no worse off than before. The problem, as has been demonstrated through the famous “prisoners’ dilemma,” is one of trust, commitment, and the fear of exploitation.

For rational choice theorists, the circumstances, both international and domestic,

surrounding the war choice are *themselves* the product of strategic choices. Rational choice theory can produce counter-intuitive, testable results. Though it is generally the case that nations with greater capabilities will behave most aggressively, there are some situations in which one should expect less militarily endowed countries to behave aggressively. When faced with a potential threat, some weak states (“pacific doves”) have a strong incentive to attack preemptively, in part because the chance of getting lucky in a first strike is the only hope that they have of receiving a positive payoff.

Another interesting application of rational choice theory is to the question of the impact of domestic political regime on international politics. Analysis of the size of the group that chooses state decision makers, in conjunction with the particular array of goods that national leaders are empowered to distribute, can produce noteworthy results. For instance, monarchies tended to disappear over the past several centuries because the rulers of such regimes had few domestic incentives to punish vigorously adversaries that they defeated in war, while both democracies and authoritarian dictatorships did and do.

Through the formal structure of rational choice models, Dr. Bueno de Mesquita argued, we gain understanding of both of events and of *non-events*, as well as foster independence between arguments and the evidence used to assess the arguments. Finally, some game theoretic models of international relations have proven effective in *predicting* decisions in real time. In his conclusion, Bueno de Mesquita expressed confidence that rational choice models predicted future events with greater accuracy than other types of models.

During the comment period, Kenneth Waltz argued that countries seldom have a choice as to whether or not to be a “Great Power,” noting the possible exception of Japan. Furthermore, Waltz wondered if the Coase Theorem really could be applied to a situation such as that immediately prior to World War I. Bueno de Mesquita replied that one would have to imagine that prior to the outbreak of war, the “players” could envision ending up with the Treaty of Versailles. Theoretically, some option was available whereby all parties would be at least as well off as they were prior to the war. When Peter Fever of Duke University asked whether Bueno de Mesquita could explain the post-1968 nuclear arms race with a rational actor model, given that Dr. Waltz had as much as labeled the arms race irrational, Bueno de Mesquita replied that actions do not have to be productive to be rational. It may be the case that alternatives to the

option chosen were still more unproductive for the decision maker. Anatol Rapoport, who along with Thomas Schelling was a pioneer of game theoretic analysis, cautioned, however, that a model that infers politicians' preferences from their actions risks becoming tautological and increases the probability of error.

**Jack Levy** closed the first day of the workshop with a talk on "Framing, Loss Aversion, Crisis Bargaining and War." Rational choice (or "expected utility") models have increasingly come under attack as making unrealistic assumptions about human cognitive processes. Levy's talk was designed to suggest how a theory developed by social psychologists to explain experimental evidence of systematic deviations from expected-utility theory might be applied to the analysis of international politics, conflict and war.

Prospect theory posits that how people frame a choice problem around a "reference point" has a critical influence on their choices. People tend to overweight losses with respect to comparable gains, to be risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses, and to accommodate to gains much more quickly than to losses in defining their reference points. Experiments also have found that people tend to respond to differences in the probabilities associated with a given choice in a non-linear manner.

Among the hypotheses that Levy draws from prospect theory for the study of international politics are the following: (1) In general, there is a greater tendency to move towards the reference point than rational choice theories would predict. (2) States will generally take greater risks to maintain their power, positions, and resources against threatened losses than to improve their positions. (3) After the seizure of territory, the victim will frame its reference point around the *status quo ante* and will take excessive risks to recover its losses, while the aggressor will frame his reference point around the new *status quo* and be risk-acceptant in its efforts to maintain its gains. (4) States in decline will be more inclined to adopt risk-acceptant policies, including preventive war, to avoid further losses. (5) States behave differently when they are bargaining over losses than when they are bargaining over gains -- they tend to demand more, concede less, take greater risks, reach negotiated agreements less frequently for losses than for gains, and thus run a greater risk of crisis escalation. (6) It is easier to coerce the adversary by denying it gains than by denying it the opportunity to recover losses, which reinforces Schelling's argument that deterrence is generally easier than compellance.

The element of prospect theory that is most unique in its implications for international politics is the idea that an actor's reference point can shift. While rational choice is consistent with some of the other hypotheses of prospect theorists, the idea that preference orderings may vary (where in one situation, a negotiation payoff is preferable to war, and in the next situation, negotiations that promise to deliver roughly the same payoff as in the first instance are seen as less attractive than taking a chance of winning greater gains through war) assaults a core assumption of rational choice. Furthermore, while prospect theory posits that actors maximize, maximization is non-linear. People do not seem to be as sensitive to probability values as postulated by rational choice theory -- they tend to overweight "utility" values, while underweighting probability values.

Prospect theory is by no means trouble free, according to Levy. Because the selection of a reference point is critical for how an actor will behave according to prospect theory, the absence of a theory of what drives the selection of the reference point is a major problem. Furthermore, testing whether the theory holds in an international politics setting is difficult. How would one find out, for example, whether Saddam Hussein's reference point shifted following his invasion of Kuwait to incorporate the conquered territory into his "endowment?"

Ultimately, Levy concluded, because rational choice theories are more parsimonious, the burden of proof should be on prospect theory to show that it is a more powerful analytical tool. Prospect theorists need to move toward developing a strategic interaction version of the model if it is to contend seriously with rational choice.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita argued during the comment period that prospect "theory" is not truly a theory because it does not generate truly testable hypotheses. The "theory," rather, seems to be a restatement of observed empirical regularities. Nor does the theory necessarily generate results that are unique, he added, citing instances in which rational choice theorists produced results very similar to those expected by prospect theorists.

Thomas Schelling, on the other hand, remarked that there do seem to be many people who do not think that probabilities apply to them, and therefore do not behave as rational choice models would predict. "Superstition" cannot be ruled out as an important factor in some decisions relevant to the study of international politics and war.

At the end of the day, Dick Kohn invited the afternoon panelists to summarize where they thought that political science and the study of war was headed.

While Bueno de Mesquita felt that the field was on the verge of a “Newtonian revolution” in the study of war,

Jack Levy was more guarded in his optimism. He sees significant splits in the field. On the one hand, a large number of analysts are moving towards working with axiom-based theory, while on the other hand a large number of people are moving towards “thick” description and, at times, “post-modern” analytical approaches. Levy foresees some major paradigmatic battles on the horizon. His concern is that the battles will distract scholars from the important task of theory construction and testing.

Scott Littlehale, Rapporteur.

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**Thomas Schelling** opened the second day of T.I.S.S.’s “Political Science, Conflict Resolution, and War” with a talk entitled “The War That Did Not Happen.” Fifty years after the atomic bombing of Japan, nuclear weapons have not been used again in combat. In particular, Professor Schelling illustrated two categories of nuclear conflict that have not occurred. First, a global nuclear holocaust has not taken place. Second, no nuclear-armed state has used nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-armed state. It is from this point that Professor Schelling began his analysis.

According to Schelling, a typical response to the question of why a nuclear holocaust did not happen in the decades after Hiroshima and Nagasaki involves some form of cost-benefit analysis performed by the major nuclear powers. Quite simply, in this view nuclear warfare was not seen as profitable. No decision maker would ever consciously initiate a nuclear conflict because the costs of such a conflict would far outweigh the benefits. Thus, war is avoided.

In contrast to conventional arguments, however, Dr. Schelling finds this perspective somewhat questionable because during the 1950’s, it was recognized that the fear of war might generate a nuclear conflict. “War by accident, miscalculation, and surprise was seen as a danger created by the immense advantage of what came to be called the ‘first strike.’” Schelling maintained that the conscious effort of politicians and members of the military to develop and deploy weapons capable of withstanding a preemptive attack led to the goal and achievement of “mutual deterrence.” Thus, it

was the choice of weapons that closed the opportunity for war between the nuclear powers. In support of his argument, Professor Schelling gave a historical account of the American nuclear weapons program drawing on government documents, interviews, and personal experiences.

In the second segment of his talk, Schelling addressed the issue of why nuclear weapons were not used when a nuclear power clashed with a non-nuclear state. This question seems especially appropriate considering the desperate status of US military forces during key periods of the Korean War. According to Schelling, Eisenhower considered using nuclear weapons in the Korean conflict, but was advised against it. Nuclear weapons were considered qualitatively different armaments both by his advisors and the general population. Eisenhower sought to remove this “nuclear taboo,” but his successors had a different perspective on the issue. Both Kennedy and Johnson held the strong belief that there was “no such thing as a conventional nuclear weapon.” This tradition of “non-use” was also honored by the Soviet Union. Thus, nuclear warfare was avoided. Professor Schelling concluded his talk, however, with a warning that states that have newly acquired nuclear weapons may not feel subject to this principle of non-use.

In the panel discussion that followed, Bruce Russett lauded Schelling’s detailed historical analysis. However, Russett called into question Schelling’s neglect of organizational history in his account of the absence of nuclear war. According to Professor Russett, standardized routines shape military behavior, and these routines are extremely resistant to change. Thus, “If you take the command and control literature seriously, we owe the non-use of nuclear weapons to the fact that there was no diplomatic crisis during the launch-on-warning period.

Following Russett’s comment, Anatol Rapoport engaged Professor Schelling in a lively debate. According to Rapoport, the entire discussion of why nuclear war did not occur is misplaced. In Rapoport’s view, it is appropriate to ask why something did not occur when regularity is violated. Nuclear war is not a usual occurrence and therefore, it seems surprising to Rapoport that we would engage in this type of inquiry.

On a related point, Rapoport challenged Schelling’s assertion that the lack of nuclear warfare between the nuclear powers is the result of “mutual deterrence.” According to Rapoport, the notion that deterrence worked is only established in hindsight.

Because of the lack of historical regularity, it is difficult to determine when, if ever, deterrence is successful.

The second speaker on Saturday was **Bruce Russett** who gave a talk entitled "The Kantian Project." According to Dr. Russett, Immanuel Kant spoke of a "perpetual peace" based on three conditions. First, Kant spoke of the peaceful relations that would develop between states with republican constitutions. Second, Kant wrote on the rise of "cosmopolitan law," or the ordered relations of economic interdependence that would develop among states. Finally, Kant foresaw the rise of international law and order facilitated by international institutions.

When Kant wrote of the perpetual peace, he was writing as a visionary. According to Russett, however, Kant's vision has proven to be quite accurate. In the modern era, we have seen the rise of democracies; an increase in the level of economic interdependence; and more international organizations than at any other time. All of these factors have seemingly created a pacifying effect on interstate relations.

To support his claim, Russett referenced a substantial body of research indicating that stable democracies rarely go to war with each other or engage in military disputes with one another, especially in the post-World War II era. Research has shown that democracies are 1/8 as likely as alternative regimes to threaten each other and 1/10 as likely to use any type of force against one another. Professor Russett was careful to note, however, that this research does not indicate that democracies are more peaceful than other types of regimes. Rather, evidence suggests that democracies are more peaceful in their relations with other democracies.

Professor Russett then addressed the possibility that the democratic peace may be the result of confounding variables. With low conflict as his dependent variable, Russett stated that his empirical research has suggested that even when controlling for "realist variables," which have been suggested as a cause of the democratic peace (such as the presence of alliances, relative power, distance, and wealth), joint democracy is a significant explanatory variable. Research done on "pre-industrial" societies conducted by Professor Russett also suggests that, in general, participatory societies are less likely to fight each other. Thus, while not a universal law, Professor Russett suggests that the "democratic peace" is a strong probabilistic statement.

In his empirical research, Russett also tests the assertion that economic interdependence and the existence of international organizations will have a pacifying effect on international relations. Economic interdependence is often seen as a pacifying influence because it affects the cost-benefit analysis of decision makers and because trade is a carrier of information that can help in resolving disputes. International organizations are also seen as information carriers. Russett's research suggests that both of these variables are significant in explaining the democratic peace. The addition of these variables, however, does not eliminate the independent effect of joint democracy on peace.

Ole Holsti began the discussion of Russett's presentation by questioning the robustness of his findings because there have been relatively few democracies from which to form conclusions. Professor Russett responded by acknowledging that the robustness of his findings is indeed problematic. In his opinion, there is little researchers can do, however, but to wait and see what transpires.

After lunch, the afternoon session began with **Ole Holsti** delivering a talk entitled "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and War." Professor Holsti placed the relationship between public opinion and war in a broad context by examining the centuries-old debate on the effects of public opinion between liberals, represented by Immanuel Kant, and the realists, represented by Alexis DeTocqueville. Kant's view that people are rational and will not do certain things creates a perception of public opinion as a useful constraint on the ability of the state to go to war. This view is in distinct contrast to DeTocqueville's observation that the masses are subject to periods of great passion or ignorance. In such instances, public opinion is a detriment to foreign policy. It is this latter line of reasoning that has shaped realist perspectives on foreign policy.

Holsti continued by placing the debate on the effects of public opinion against the backdrop of the international events of the twentieth century. The role and effect of public opinion on foreign policy were recognized by both the Allies and the Axis powers as early as World War I. Both sides distributed propaganda to the citizens of the opposing side to undermine public opinion of the respective governments. In the period leading into World War II, critics such as Walter Lippman and E.H. Carr challenged the notion that public opinion was a positive thing.

The conclusion of World War II coincided with the development of wide-scale public polling. A series of studies was conducted that was driven by fears about the U.S. resuming the isolationist role that it played after World War I. The result of these studies yielded what became known as the Almond-Lippman consensus. This consensus held that a) the public tended to be ignorant and indifferent to foreign policy issues, b) public opinion tended to be unconstructed and incoherent, and c) public opinion had no impact on foreign policy decision making.

Public opinion research conducted during the Vietnam War provided a challenge to the Almond-Lippman consensus. In particular, the war raised doubts about whether the executive should have a free hand in foreign policy decision making. Furthermore, new studies showed that public opinion actually had a relatively high degree of stability, was somewhat structured, and had some degree of influence on policy decisions.

In his conclusion, Professor Holsti addressed the future role of public opinion. Holsti felt that public opinion is likely to play a more important role in the coming years. Many of the issues that concerned foreign policy makers in the past required speed, flexibility, and secrecy. Thus, the role of public opinion was limited. Holsti concluded it would be hard to make similar arguments for issues that confront politicians today such as immigration, the environment, and trade.

Professor Rapoport opened the discussion of Holsti's talk by questioning the value of democracy. In particular, Rapoport questioned when the masses should rule absolutely and when they should not. For example, on medical issues, most people give up some degree of authority to experts, e.g., doctors. In response, Holsti stated that the main problem with public opinion and foreign policy has to do with the level of information that the citizenry has. For example, many Americans do not understand how much is actually being spent on foreign aid. Thus, it is usually impossible for them to formulate educated opinions.

Thomas Schelling then questioned Holsti whether and how the role of public opinion has changed recently. In response, Holsti stated that pollsters are now able to give political leaders instant feedback. Thus, the ascribed value of public opinion polls has increased dramatically.

Russett concluded the discussion by raising the issue of systematic differences among the public opinion stances of different demographic segments of

the population, especially by gender. Holsti responded that evidence indicates that women are more environmentally concerned and more protectionist. In terms of use of force, however, there does not seem to be a systematic gender difference. More importantly, Holsti suggested that when controlling for party and ideology, the effects of gender on public opinion may wash out.

The final speaker of the day was **Anatol Rapoport** who delivered a talk entitled "The Institutional Approach to the Study of War." According to Dr. Rapoport, much of the research referred to as "peace research" is in actuality "war research." Although in his opinion this is unfortunate, Rapoport argued that in many ways the same can be said of medical research. In both medical science and peace research, we are interested in the causes of afflictions. In the case of medical research, these afflictions take the form of diseases. In peace research, the afflictions take the form of war.

According to Rapoport, in both realms, researchers endeavor to find the necessary causes of the afflictions. In his opinion, the necessary cause for war is already known. It is the existence of weapons. Without weapons, wars of complete destruction are impossible. Unfortunately, no infrastructure exists for implementing a cure for war.

Rapoport then presented a challenge to the orthodox treatment of peace research. As opposed to viewing war as an event with onsets, durations, and ends, which naturally suggests an investigation of causes, Rapoport offered an alternative opinion that war can be studied as an institution. When war is analyzed as an institution, it is analogous to slavery.

Taking war as an institution, Professor Rapoport suggested is necessary to study the origin, behavior, and evolution of the institutions. In particular, the latter characteristic proves most interesting to him. In Rapoport's opinion, war "adapts" to its environment, so that it can survive. Institutions that do not adapt cease to exist. Thus, war may one day become obsolete, but such developments will not occur because of some abstract notion of morality or justice. Rather, wars could cease because they become stagnant and non-evolutionary.

Professor Rapoport argued that war continues to exist because it has become so embedded within society that its existence is seen as indispensable. Thus, war has defended itself against the forces that would destroy it.

The speaker concluded his presentation by arguing that both monarchs and war are obsolete in that they have lost their original function. Both have adapted to the changing environment, however, and continue to exist. This is the only similarity, however, between monarchs and war. In Rapoport's opinion, war is far more insidious because the profits of the war trade now help to finance world trade. In this way, the tools of war have embedded themselves within the society.

Dr. Russett opened the discussion of Rapoport's presentation by challenging his characterization of the Correlates of War project as an example of a non-institutionalist approach to the study of war. In Russett's opinion, the Correlates of War project has evolved to the point where war is treated as part of a pattern and is now more process-oriented. Russett further challenged the notion that war will continue to adapt. Using both the Supreme Soviet and the Cold War as examples, Professor Russett asserted that many institutions cease to exist. Thus, perhaps war can be eradicated as well.

Rapoport was then questioned as to the possibility of changing the social environment within which war adapts. In his response, Rapoport noted that a simple answer to this question is impossible. Each individual should be aware of the surrounding environment and act accordingly. However, individual action will probably prove inadequate. Rather, some form of collective action will be needed to eradicate the institution of war.

Robert Nabors, Rapporteur

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### **T.I.S.S. Outreach Activities**

T.I.S.S. outreach programs continued under the direction of postdoctoral fellow Matt Oyos for the 1995-1996 school year. In addition to his duties with T.I.S.S., Matt is teaching for the UNC Department of History while Dick Kohn enjoys a year of academic leave.

Community outreach remained active during the summer and fall through the OPTIONS program. OPTIONS facilitates talks by faculty members and other specialists to community groups such as the Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs on a diversity of timely topics related to international security. Since our last newsletter, five more talks have occurred and three more are already scheduled for early 1996. Peter Feaver of Duke University spoke to the Bright Leaf

Civitan Club of Durham in July on the Clinton administration's foreign policy, while Peter Coclanis of UNC-Chapel Hill talked with the same group in August on the future of Hong Kong. In September, Russel Van Wyk spoke to the Peace Lunch Forum in Raleigh on the topic of historical memory in Bosnia, and in November Dick Kohn discussed diversity in the military services with the Durham Midrasha. This fall we also completed the recruiting of new OPTIONS speakers, asked current speakers to revisit their topics, and prepared a new brochure for the coming year. We again have a rich range of topics to offer community organizations in 1996.

T.I.S.S. also conducted its fifth annual Graduate Studies and International Careers conference in October. This one-day affair informed undergraduates from North Carolina's historically black colleges and universities with the opportunities that advanced study provides for a career in an international field. The conference gives students information about careers and programs of study from practitioners and graduate school officials. This year approximately 45 students and accompanying faculty participated in six sessions at The Carolina Inn in Chapel Hill. Sessions were devoted to international law, international business, graduate school admissions and finances, life as a graduate student, the study of international relations, and the United States Foreign Service. Speakers included Scott Silliman, Executive Director of the Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security at Duke University; Gerri Henderson and Andre Scott of Duke's Fuqua School of Business; Henry Frierson, Associate Dean of the UNC Graduate School; Clifford Griffin of the North Carolina State Political Science Department; Robert Nabors of the UNC Political Science graduate program; and Peter Whitney, a U.S. Foreign Service officer and Diplomat in Residence at Duke University. The contribution of these individuals' time and effort helped to make the day's program a success.

Sharing of scholarly resources through its speakers program is an important part of T.I.S.S. outreach. In November, T.I.S.S. helped arrange an appearance at UNC-Chapel Hill by delegates to the Beijing Conference on Women, which met earlier this year. The delegates were visiting the Research Triangle area as part of the Great Day Peace Train, which the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom sponsored. The delegates discussed issues that were debated during the conference and events, sometimes controversial, that occurred over the course of the meeting. In early December, T.I.S.S. sponsored a presentation by a Russian Fulbright fellow at Shaw

University in Raleigh. Elena Osokina spoke to students and faculty at Shaw's International Studies Center on the hierarchy of consumption in the Soviet Union on the eve of World War II. As a Fulbright fellow, Dr. Osokina is teaching for the Department of History at UNC during the 1995-1996 school year and is also working on her own research about the Soviet economy. Her home institution is the Institute of Russian History at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. She is a tremendous resource to have available in the Research Triangle area, and we are pleased that she has offered to share her knowledge as a visiting speaker.

Finally, the seventh annual Model United Nations, which T.I.S.S. will co-host with the North Carolina Consortium for International and Intercultural Education, is scheduled for March 21-23, 1996, in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Winston-Salem State University is the host institution this year, and the event will be held at the Adams Mark Hotel in downtown Winston-Salem.

Groups interested in the model U.N. or in scheduling T.I.S.S. speakers should contact Matt Oyos at 962-8601.

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### **T.I.S.S. Dinner Seminars - Fall 1995**

The Institute continued its dinner seminar series during the Fall 1995 semester. In October, T.I.S.S. co-sponsored Tufts University historian Martin Sherwin, who spoke to a large audience at Duke University on "The Mission of the Enola Gay: The History and Politics of Hiroshima, 1945-1995." Sherwin argued that there was no compelling reason why nuclear weapons had to be used against Japan and that the United States could have secured Japan's surrender without an invasion. Dr. Sherwin's talk provoked spirited debate from academics and policy practitioners alike.

Reflecting T.I.S.S.'s multidisciplinary nature, T.I.S.S. members gathered at Pyewacket Restaurant to hear Professors Cori Dauber and Erik Doxtader of UNC's Department of Speech Communications speak on "Rhetoric and the Study of War." Together they provided an excellent overview on the role of rhetoric in international relations. Dr. Dauber spoke on the rhetoric employed in the period surrounding the Gulf War and how it was used by particular branches of the U.S. military to advance their particular interests.

Professor Doxtader's talk was equally stimulating and the audience reaction indicated that common ground had been found with several other disciplines.

In December, Professor Eliot Cohen of the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, presented on "The Revolution in Military Affairs Debate." The talk and subsequent discussion brought out important points both for and against the idea that technology had fundamentally altered the nature of military operations in today's world. Dr. Cohen argued that certain aspects of war fighting had changed including improved capabilities in the areas of targeting, information gathering, and command and control. While he noted continuities in the conduct of warfare today as compared to earlier periods, his overall conclusion was that technological change had altered significantly the nature of warfare.

All of the seminars were well attended, and T.I.S.S. regrets that because of high demand and limited space, it could not accommodate all who wished to attend these events. We look forward to equally stimulating topics during the spring semester.

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### **Coming Events**

**February 1, 6:30 p.m., Duke University.** A talk by Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs, on Sino-American security policy in the twenty-first century. Call Peter Feaver at 660-4312 for details.

**February 14, 4:00 p.m., Duke University.** A talk by George Tenet, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, on "Do We Need the CIA?" Call Peter Feaver for further details.

### ***"History and War"***

The Triangle Institute for Security Studies continues its Study of War series with a one-day "Quail Roost" conference entitled "**History and War.**"

#### **Conference Schedule and Location**

The meeting will be held on March 22, 1996, at The Carolina Inn in Chapel Hill. Registration will begin at 8 a.m. As with previous conferences in this series, the day's proceedings will include presentations by four speakers, question-and-answer and discussion periods, and a luncheon at the conference site. There is no

charge for attending the conference. The conference will end at 5:00 p.m.

These distinguished scholars have agreed to appear.

**William McNeill, University of Chicago**

**Walter Kaegi, University of Chicago**

**Ralph Sawyer, Independent Scholar and Author**

**Gerhard Weinberg, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill**

#### **Registration**

If you would like to attend the conference, please send us a written request at the letterhead address. The deadline for notifying us that you plan to attend is Monday, March 8, 1996. If you subsequently have to cancel your reservation, please let us know as soon as possible.

#### **Staying Overnight in Chapel Hill**

We have reserved a block of rooms at The Carolina Inn in Chapel Hill, the site of the conference. To reserve one of these rooms, contact the Inn at (919) 933-2001. Please make your reservation directly with the hotel. The group rate we have been given is \$99/night for a single guest, or \$109 night for two. Although we have set aside these rooms for conference participants, those who reserve them are responsible for the room rental charge and any other costs incurred.

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Duke University's Center for International Studies invites T.I.S.S. members to learn about their activities by subscribing to the center's newsletter. If interested, please write CIS at Box 90404, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708 or send the message "subscribe intl-studies-calender" to [majordomo@acpub.duke.edu](mailto:majordomo@acpub.duke.edu)

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T.I.S.S. is starting an electronic mail list for those members who would like to receive T.I.S.S. announcements by email instead of "snail mail." If interested, please email us at [tiss.ham@mhs.unc.edu](mailto:tiss.ham@mhs.unc.edu).

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#### **In Memorium**

T.I.S.S. regrets the untimely passing away of Samuel N. Drew and Joseph Kruzel in Bosnia in August 1995 while on a mission to promote peace in the region. Mr. Drew was a UNC alumnus with a B.A. in journalism ('70) and a master's degree in political science ('72).

Joe Kruzel was an early member of the Triangle Universities Security Seminar while serving on the faculty in the Department of Political Science at Duke University. During his stay at Duke, he played an instrumental role in attracting significant funding from the Ford Foundation for TUSS activities. A 1967 graduate of the Air Force Academy, his active duty included service on the SALT I negotiating team. Upon completion of his military service, Joe earned M.A. and Ph.D. degrees at Harvard. In addition to his many contributions for TUSS, his years at Duke were marked by significant research contributions on arms control issues, frequent public lectures, and brilliant teaching that made him among the most popular instructors on campus.

From Duke, Joe moved to Ohio State University where he was director of the Mershon Center Program on International Security and Military Affairs. While at Ohio State, Joe founded and edited the highly respected *Defense Annual*. He took a two-year leave of absence from OSU in 1993 to accept a position as deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO affairs. He made some fifty trips to Europe in connection with the conflict in Bosnia. Just prior to his tragic death in that country, he had resigned his position at OSU in order to continue his government service.

Joe Kruzel is survived by his wife, Gail, and two children, John and Sarah, all of McLean, VA.

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#### **T.I.S.S. On-line**

If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions about T.I.S.S. or its activities, you can reach us through email at [tiss.ham@mhs.unc.edu](mailto:tiss.ham@mhs.unc.edu). Also look for our web page coming soon on the World Wide Web. It can be accessed through the web page for the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense (found at <http://www.unc.edu/depts/pwad>)

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